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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
--OF THE --
STATE~UTAH ------
XcSf1 I::DL'STRIAL DEVELOP~NTS, 
r•·1~ California Corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondent, 
"'''L 11'1oKES and LOR~!A JEWKES, 
ul:sJan,1 -1nd r,..Hfe, 
Defendants-Appellant, 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 19374 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS, INC. 
NATURE OF THE CASE ---------
This case was brought by Respondent to foreclose a Trust Deed 
• 1Jich. secures a first deed note. The Appellant answered claiming 
olair1tiff did not live up to prior agreements and counterclaimed 
•'~airnJng lhe olaintiff would be unjustly enriched if the mortgage was 
~--,rf!clo~od. 
DISPOSITION IN TFIE LOWER COURT 
The lower C::ourt eranted a Decree of Foreclosure in Lhe si;~ 
$265,777.lll princioal and $29,919.79 interest, attornev fees int'·· 
sum of $26,577.00 and dismissed defendants Counterclaim. 
Respondent seeks to have the trial Court's Decree and award of 
attorney fees be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The land which is the subject matter of this lawsuit was,rori0r 
to dissolution of the partnership) owned by a partnership bv the naoe 
of Cedar Hills Development Company. In March 18, 1977, the Cedar Pills 
Development Company partnership entered into a contract with an entitv 
known as Tirnpanogos Cove Develoornent Corporation. The contract was 
entitled a "Continuing Option". The "Continuinf' Ootion" affected 19) 
acres of land. (Exhibit 'lo. 1). By the terms of the "Continu1r.2 
Option'', Timpanogos Cove, the optionee, had the rie:ht every ten monc~:: 
to pay the sum of $123,500.00 and to acquire title to cwentv acres J'. 
land of opt ionee 's owr choosing out of the tot al 19 3 acres. So lo no is 
the optionee paid the sum of $123,500.00 every ten months, t\e 
optionee could preserve its right to acoui re future parcels of :re 
affected land. In the event the optionee failed to make anv oavrnenl :· 
entitle it to obtain title to acreaee. the optionee's rie-ht LO 'lcqiJl:--F-
additional acreage was lost a The optionee acquired 113 ,gcres r)f l:rn,: 
( 2) 
'"' successive oayTTients and conveyances. The land conveyed was chosen 
, l•e ootlonee. The land which optionee chose isolates the remaining 
acres, the land foreclosed uoon, from access except by going over 
·.r chr0ugh the 113 acres which was chosen and received. 
The Cedar Hills Development Company partnership was dissolved in 
i9Rn. The rights of Cedar Hills Development Company as optionor in the 
"Continuing Option Agreement" was assigned to Associated Industrial 
Development Inc., hereinafter referred to as AID. Before the 
dissolution of Cedar Hills Development Company, hence before the 
Jsslgnment of the partnership's interest to Associated Industrial 
~evelooers, the rights of Timpanogos Cove were assigned to the 
defendRnt Jewkes. Jewkes ls a real estate developer of some 34 years 
of experience and apparently became interested in the acquisition of 
the orooertv affected by the Continuing Option by reason of the fact 
Lhat oe owned some 200 acres in the immediate vicinity of the affected 
\and. 
The payment required by the "Continuing Option" to be made in May 
Jf !981 was not made. The pavment required by the "Continuing Option" 
was che sum of 5!23,500.00. Instead of paying the sum of $123,500.00, 
'e•,·kes oaid S30,000.00 and entered into an agreement of May 15, 1981, 
•t•lch modified the "Continuing Option". The agreement was called 
'xcensino of nption Agreement". (Exhibit No. 3). 
The "Continuiniz Option" as orielnally dr;p..rn reaui red r:erta:.:-i '3 
of the optionor. Before the a"reement of May IS, 1981 which modi:· 
the Continuin" Option, earlier ae:reements had been made between 
and Jewkes modifyine: the terms of the "Continuin" notion'', call 
"Amendment to Continuine: Option", Exhibit No. 2. 
The "Continuine: Option" to Purchase required certain acts of :», 
optionor. The optionor had to ruarantee certain water anrl sewer line, 
extensions, hook up fees, and sufficient water and sewer capacitv t·, 
service the 193 acres. Exhibit No. 2, called "Amendment to Continuio' 
Option to Purchase" deleted from the "Continuine: Option to Purchase 
the optionor's oblisrntion to furnish sewer and water hook up fees cc 
the warrant that there was sufficient water and sewer capaci tv in tee 
Cedar Hills Development utility system to service the 193 acres. :he 
remainine: act that AID was to perform that of extendin" water anJ 
sewer lines to a point rlesiiznated by t.he buyer, was excused bv Jewke:: 
in exchane:e for payment of the ae:reed cost of that performance 
Jewkes (Exhibit No. 6). All other prior a"reernents and unrlerstanci1'' 
and oblisrntions were mere:ed into the deed of trust and the note bv t'•e 
express terms of the wricten aereement called "Extension of llodor 
Ae:reement" (Exhibit No. 3). 
(.'.+) 
Tt·e lerms of the agreement, Exhibit No. 3, modifying the 
J nui n I! nptl on" contained provisions, among other things, 
coJ· iclh·z lral the method of payment by Jewkes for the remainder of 
-"" land affected bv the "Continuing Option" would be changed, Instead 
cf oavments everv ten months in the principal amount of $123,500.00 
: : JS interest, pavments were to be made at a reduced rate. Instead of 
na· -ients e•1erv ten months in the amount of $123,500.00, plus interest, 
semi-annual pavments of S25,000.00 plus interest were agreed to. In 
'el•1rn for accepting smaller payments, Jewkes agreed to modifications 
Jn che contractual arrangement. Jewkes agreed that instead of enjoying 
t-ie ruhcs of an optionee he would take title to all of the land and 
ccree to pav for all of the land. He agreed to accept title to eighty 
acres beJne the remaining lan<l affected by the Continuing Option and 
l0 execute a trust deed note and a trust deed in the sum of 
Sc'iS,777.Rl securing the balance of the purchase price, Jewkes also 
aereed that the prior agreements existing between the parties would be 
:erlled into lhe deed, Deed of trust and the deed of trust note. 
·'n the tnth day of November 1981, AID conveyed the land affected 
h this action, the remainder of the land affected by the "Continuing 
'"' 1-rn .. , to Jewkes and took back a deed of trust and a deed of trust 
''''"' signed bv Jewkes and by his wife. The payment required to be made 
re ,J~ed of trust note on the 15th day of May 1982 was not made and 
0Cl1011 was instituted in the District Court of Utah County to 
''"' 1->se the deed of trust and the note as a mortgage as provided by 
--1-: 1 "CA.1953. 
( 5) 
.\t the trial the executi0n and vali<1itv nf :..he ~.r·isl ~r·t' 
tr11st deed note were not in issue and lhe princira1 amount duf'- ;i~,~ 
amount owed as interest were not in issue. The amount of -1t'\..or-:ie" 
was Jn issue. Appellant in his answer set forth certain affi"Ca 
defenses, those beine failure to perform certain covenants under 
containine: option to purchase, anrl delay in performance of convp· 
clear title to the land conveved. Appellant further cross dahe· 
claimine unjust enrichment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRIOR AGREEME'.'TS, L'NDERSTANDINGS, AND 0BLIGATIONS, SETfnRTµ 
EXHIBIT ~lo. l, ''CONTimfING OPTION TrJ PL'RCflASE", FXHIRIT 'lo. 
TO CDNTH:L'I:-.JG OPTION TO PL'RCHASE", EXHIBIT ::c. 
"EXTENSirJN OF OPTION AGREEMD!T" \..'ERE EITHER PERFOR~fE!', EXrL'S'.~ 
AGREE~fENT OR ~RGED I'.'ITO THE DEED, THE TRlTST DEED, AND THE TRl'ST 
'.'IOTE. 
Aooellant in his answer and counterclaim, setforth cer~~. 
defenses and alleeations to the effect the plaintiff had noc !1·:ec 
to certain aereements. Appellant alleeed that, 
(a) Clear tit.le to various parcels of prooerty w·as n<'l ~ell ,:r-
until long after oav~ent was ~ade; and, 
I 'J,I 
'r"" isl 1•n reoui ri niz respondent to furnish •...rater and sewer to 
P•Jr c.'/ '..JerP not nromptly performed. 
1, i' iooellanl inlroduced exhibit No. 7, which set forth the 
'•' 1 l'!~. 11 non close examination of the exhihi t the onlv delav 
rn, ,11seq11ence related to the :?.0 acre convevance of 11-18-78. As 
',he nther conveyances, the exhibit shows that there was no 
r-.1 1 7 " 1nn or that they were to receive a title insurance policy 
,,r.1' reasonable time takinQ: into consideration that title 
'"'' '' e are nol normally issued immediately after the deed is 
''''"ec, hecause the title has to be researched. The testimony of 
1one} }dnl shows delays, but there is no mention of damaQ:e in dollars. 
"n,,r cross examination at T 105 and T 107 Appellant states that he 
· ,,,[j ca•:e sold land before the economic down turn and as such there 
·c·; no <lama~es to appellant. The property has not been sold even 
hn,cch he received sixty acres throuQ:h conveyances by 1978, (Exhibit 
'I acd has not been sold as of date of trial. 
The record shows lhat Appellant owned 420 acres which includes 
1r:res ourchased from the respondent all of which were conti12:uous. 
'hp record further shows that the property has been approved for 
.·,1i ·ision bul that no plats had been filed to date of trial. 
..\s Ln respondent's obligation to furnish water and sewer 
11,w-i in Exhibit ~o • "ContinuinQ: Option to Purchase", they were 
..,•,11 :erl 0r excused in return for payment of money or were 
,...~'')Se aereements in Exhibit ~o. 1, parai;rraph 9 and 10 were 
~: ~;1raeraph No. in "Amendment to Continuin" Ootion to 
c x h 1 Ci i t ': o • 2) , which sets forth the fo 11 owi n": 
I 7~ 
" ( 1) The oarties muL11;i l l v ctQ"ree lo delPCt:' fr' Jf"'\ 
said or nm: T0 PlCRCHASE LAND oara.::!:r1oh ,,(). '~i rie ', q I and 
paragraph No. Ten (in) on page 5." 
The only remaining ohli 2ati0n lO 1:--e perfor;"led unrlt'.r 
"Continuing Option to Purchase" ·..;hich relatPd to sPwer rtnd w;:itP: ~, 
ups was excused by pavment of Sl,SOO.nn as shown by ExhihiL ~;o. o. 
Exhibit No. 3, paragraph No. q of lhe "Extension of 
Agreement" states as follows: 
"Upon the convevance of the land bv AI'.' to Je•.ikes 
in November of 1981, all orior agreements, 
understandings and obligations will he merned into the 
deed and into the trust deed note and the lrust deed. 
If Jewkes does not pay the fortv thousand dollars 
($40,000.00) on or before November 15, l9Rl, then his 
rights under the continuing option and under this 
agreement shall terminate." 
Respondent claims that all agreements containerl. 
in ::irL~ 
agreements have either been performed, waived, excused hv o;:i.nr1enL, 'f 
have merged. 
The only two cases that Respondent has found that ceal 
mergers in Utah are Kelsev .':..:.Hansen 419 P.cnd 198, 19h6 and 'tuhhs ~ 
Hemmert 567 P2nd, page 16P, 
1977. Roth invol·:e earnes:. "1C1':-
agreements. 
Stubbs deals with an e3rnest 'TIOney al!reement '..rhere ~here '~~ 
sale of commercial propertv and the agreement provideri seller '
011
J 
remove equipment localed upon the prooertv sold. The cnnr:.. he~ 1 
the intent of the parties was the seller could. leave the e·-
1
u1 
the buildiniz after deliverv of Lhe deed and had 
~~--~(8)~ ............. 111111111 
.. 
r»-ent_Pr ,-H1<~ remove it_. The intent was clear. There was no men!er. 
'-e :1 rPsent case those a!2"reements that were not waived or excused 
, :_'.1r1 ~0r a monetary consideration were specifically, if any, 
·-r•ed iota the deed by the intent and lanKuaKe set forth in ParaKraph 
o c,f Fxhiblt ~lo. 3. The collateral aKreements if any, that were 
'~nt ,,:ai ·1prl or excused were intended to be mere:ed. 
Pe..;00ndent plead estoppel as a defense Jn its third defense. 
'QoP: lane testified that he di<l not at the closinl! when he paid his 
•. ·ri an<l received his deed did not raise any of the objections 
hat 'le raised Jn his answer. Appellants deposition pal!e 21, which was 
"'lhlished T q7. 
T~e alle2ed defenses of appellant to the foreclosure of the trust 
~~ed ei l her '..:ere excused waived, performed, or mere:ed, or defendant is 
~s:_1·,n:P,l fr0m assertin£ them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
rEFF'rDA'TTS' CLAI'-1 OF UNJUST E:-IRICHMENT CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED KI 
"L~:s TI>ir REl,AL'SE THE CLAI~ IS ~OT RIPE. 
The l'tah Supreme Court in First National Bank £!.._ Salt Lake City 
"avmond, 57 P.2nd 1401 (1936), has squarely addressed this issue. 
,•p 1011rL n0ted: 
i.,,;e are 
1"1[1' .!lc't-:'d 
11] ;:_ h 'r l l v to 
in accord with 
that a court 
see that equitv 
the l!eneral 
of equity has 
s hal 1 be done 
do ct ri ne 
inherent 
to all 
ii,'.l rL i ec; in a mortKage foreclosure proceedinK. The 
l --:1wr1dk in<! power, however, may place, and in this 
iqr!sd1.ction has placed, limits on such authority and 
h.is ~rescrihed n1les for its exercise. ***Thus the 
<-''llll l31--le oowers which the Courts may exercise ••. may 
In Ll:i_s 111risdicLion be exercised only after sale (and) 
11rnr :ir·~r:Pr applicalion by the party who claims to be 
; :1i11red • 
Thus :_~e :_ri.:i.l C 1)Ur'c.. r,35 finisred iL-> ,~tlt it-><-; ·.,,;1 _1 1 
respect t.o f,)rec:l0sure '.")r.ic:eedines ·...rhen lf.e de('fPt~ nf 
forerlos11r~ '1.n<i L~e nr-!t;:- ,f sale ,1rf' f'nl,..,rt"'d 1JnJ ... ..,.~ 
Lhe mat:..er nf ;_he rrrJceedines "!ll~ .:i.l t_hp ~.il,.c. 
hr0u12:hl Ln Lhe al Lent ion .Jf :..he ,'n11r:. h .. , :_re prn 1,..,,r 
proceerling. (1:::ites omiLled.I r~ •...rill '"'If> :iot2d lh:H 
under our pr0redure, ::i t.rial '"'..•urt_ is ncL ral J.:>(~ iH--inn 
to confirm the sale cf morteaeed pr,)nerL\'. -:-he clerk 
must, as a JJ.e~e mi~isl~rial dulv, enter a J.eficiencv 
judgment ae:airist the proper parties when :_he return r)f 
the sale shows L~at t~e mortl-.!a£Pd propert._v is 
for an amount sufficient to pav the '3mnunt 
owine:. (57 P.~nd at 1404 and l.'.+1-.S) 
nol snlt~ 
due anrl 
This decision makes it clear :_hat ::..he powers •1f :_!ie (:nurL na·. 
exercised only after the sale :inrl 11pon prnoer applicat.i0n .-)f 
injured party. 
In this case the sale has not taken place, the partv se•"''' 
relief has not bee:-i harmed. This rrx::ition is therefore :-int rirP : 
decision ~nd is orocedt1rally incorrect. 
The lower court held in it.s Findi:i2s nf ~act., 9arao:rr-1: 1 ~' ':o. 
the followine: 
"12. As tn defendants' counterclaim rin 'c.he t.henrv 
of unjust enrichment, the court finds that since 
plaintiff elected to Lreat the t.rusl iePd as a ~r~f!a2e 
that the rule stale in Perkins 2..:. Spencer, l~l r·. ~hA 
243 P.2d ~.'.to, is not. aQolicahle t.0 this nr0ceedi'.1e. \n·: 
enhancement in value of the ~rooerty by reason nf 
imorovements 1lade by defendanLs would he refler:ted I'.1 
bids at the sheriff's sale, and in any event defent~ant.s 
reLain t.heir ri2hts of redemotion." 
The aooel Li:-it. 'lad the ootion ~o take relea<;e nf :' 'IC~~·...; 
makin£ certain pavmencs, ?xhibil \'o. r~e received Ill JC!"f'-'-
: ,, ' ... •-
"''" >-iv his own choice. ~'e bas been a land de•_relooer for 3~ 
1:. ~ ' 1 '"'~s i~ excess of ~CH) acres adjoinin£ the RrJtv acres and had 
~J "i\!" lf ::..he condition he created pert.ainine: lo the suhject 
"' c'· "e should not be ah le to ask the equity be considered in 
. ,,,,, ,,f h1 s own conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
1: .\TTOR'.ITY' S FEE OF TEN PERCENT IS REASONABLE IN Tf'1S CASE 
'c ·'F THE l.REAT TIME AND LABOR EXPENDED; THE DIFFICULTY AND 
''''P'.: .''.TY IJF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WERE ENCOUNTERED; THE EXPERIENCE OF 
·1c · .. Y,,'FP I:.'\'OL\'ED; TPE BENEFITS WHICH ACCRL"ED FROM THE CONTROVERSY; 
: "E ;'DOFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND POTENTIAL LIABILITY PLACED 
''![ ATT0R'.IEY l'i VIEW OF THE LARGE Sl'MS OF MmTEY r:Ni"lLVED. 
· tah C:ode Annotated 78-37-9 in pertinent part provides: 
In al 1 cases of foreclosure when an attorney's fee 
is claimed hy the plaintiff, the amount thereof shall 
rt: •1xecl by t.he court, any stipulation to the contrarv 
,,,,1_ •..;ilhsLandinl!; provided, no other or rreater amount 
•l•al 1 N> allowed or decreed than the sum which shall 
1nnPar hv lhe evidence to be actually chare:ed hy and to 
'w :·aiJ to the attornev for the plaintiff. 
·~ich •>nly minor modification, this has been the statutory rule 
'flt''.' fees in rnorteaee foreclosures for the State of Ctah 
:._l1P1 of the century. The precursor of 78-37-9 VCS was 
1c , .inn '))'15 of the r:ompi led Laws of the State of Utah of 
(11) 
1907. There is no substantive difference he tween the current 
statute and sections 3504 and 35iJ5 of the Campi led Laws of lhe , 
of Utah in 1907. 
Utah case law interpretin" these provisions is deflniti"e. 
Kurtz v. 0!1'den Canvon Sanitarium Companv, 37 Utah 313, lr'rR P. 
(1910), the Utah Supreme Court held that the matter of atlornev's; 
in mortQ'age foreclosures is, to a larQ'e extent left to the discreci 
of the trial court. In interpret in" sections 3504 and 3505 of ,., 
Compiled Laws of l'tah of 1907, the court held that a provision ic 
note secured by a mortgaQ'e which provided for attorney's fees of ce· 
percent was reasonable and that assertions to the contrarv ·.-ec, 
without merit. 
Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 145 P. Jrl36 (1914), also lnternrecc· 
sections 3504 and 3505. In Jensen the court held: 
By a "Reasonable fee", no doubt, is meant one 
which is reasonable under all the facts and 
circumstances of each case. What is reasonable, 
therefore, in lar"e measure at least must depend upon 
the amount in controversy, the labor, and 
responsibility imposed upon the attornev in ohtalnin» 
judl!1Dent as these may have arisen from the issues 
presented and tried. If an attorney is required to do 
no more than prepare the formal pleadin"s and decree in 
a default case, a smaller sum, no doubt, would be 
reasonable, than in a contested case, and especially in 
one where the issues-were numer~n~here intricate 
que s tTO;;S ~ hOthf a er-,; nd 1 aw a r-;;g; '"""3nd had l o be 
determined :--c ]45 P. li5367t 11538, emphas~ added)-
CL' • 
'!•ire recently, the Utah Supreme Court has cited the holdings of 
.,nser1 3nJ Kurtz. In Mason:!...:_ Mason, 160 P.2d 730 (1945), the court 
''""terl extensively from both cases, citing with approval the rules 
ex;iounded therein. ?fore recently, in Lockhart Co. :!...:_Anderson, 646 
'.'d r,rn (!9R2), the court referred with approval to the holding of 
As pointed out in ~, the trial courts in each case become 
C3~i 1 iar ;;ith all the issues, know just what facts and circumstances 
develooe at the hearing, and thus are in a position to derive an 
int_dJigent and just conclusion respecting the amount that should be 
.1] lowed as the reasonable fee contemplated by our statute. In the 
E\'en" that the court has insufficient data upon which to base a 
:1~dinir i:.. may, as pointed out in Kurtz, call to its assistance 
at~nrney<; enga.,ed in practice and take their judgment under oath 
respecting the amount that would be reasonable in any given case. That 
is i:: fact what was done in the instant case. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona has considered this 
issue in a factual settin" very similar to the instant case. In McCune 
'· Dvnamics Research Inc., 442 P.2d 550 ( 1968), plaintiff brought an 
'r'l;•10 to foreclose a note and mortgage in the amount of $170,000.00. 
'"' chat case, counsel for the plaintiff presented affidavits to the 
Jn which their counsel set forth in chronological order the 
,=>rer1res
1 
Lrips, negotiations, filings of various pleadine:s, court 
(13) 
appearances, tak1ne ,Jf deposi l inns, and 1P'>Ial ri:>sP~rr:1-i. r"1i;v-' 
indicated thal he had 14 ?ears of oractice ;;ind Ll-i;il in !->is 0ri,:· 
reasonable fee for his services '..Jas Sl"',111 1 1~,.'I(" "f :-_en ~e~cer:L. 
The defendant in ~~cCune did ~ot file cnnlr'l\'er:.l:il! ;if~icia · 1 ~) 
did he reauesl time to submi~ evidence <r:ilh re<Iard to chP atcorco 
fees. The court held t'riat ::i.t~:Jt:1ev's fees ;ire gener;illv ·..:iLhi"' 
sound discretion of the trial ccur:. 's 4ud£menL and that in thal ,-2 s"' 
since plaintiff had not responded to the affida,:i ts, toe re 'oas 
evidence to dispute the serYices rendered r:ior the oronosition tl-ia: 
fee was reasonable. The court helrl that ten percent 'Jf ~toe ~nnw1: 
controversy, in consideration for the ·,.,rork invol':ed, did :lOl ar'0w~ 
abuse 0f discretion bv the trial cnu;:. in this re2'ard. "'."he ,,0ur: .,._ 
tl-iat the trial courts il1d~ent :0r attornev's fees nf ten 0~r-:e:: ... · .. :e~: 
oroper. 
In the present case, Peber Grant I';ins, atlornev from ~rreri-::; 
Fork, L'tah, tes::.ified that for a contesled f0reclosurP suer SIS Lr·:-
with the larg"e sum 0f money involved and in view of ::..he comol.-::•x:~·.· 
the case, which involved a counter-claim 1 wbic~ required dec-0s:t'' 
and numerous '.JTitten interroeatories as · ... ·ell ;::i.s considPrar~.:i 
research, and as a consecuence eif tbe resoonsi ~i ~i ::.y dssumed '"''' 
attorney, and hased •Joon Arr.erican Bar :.\ssoci;::i.ti 1'Jn 0.Jil"lelines, l..;>L 
percent wrts a reasonable at.:.nr;,ev's fee. 
I 1-,) 
\L :rial, ·when counsel for Lhe plaintiff offered to testify in 
. 1.c· ·f 'iis attorney's fees, counsel for the defendant objected and 
''1S oJ.OLained, T sn. This being the case, the defendant has waived 
rJ" examination of plaintiff's counsel and his opportunity to 
:hallenze the amount of attornev's fees. The defendant cannot object 
Lhe ·.estlmony of plaintiff's counsel's attorney's fees, thereby 
·.''."E. en:..1"1~ the introduction of this evidence and subsequently complain 
the court that the fees are unreasonable. This is because 
~-::'..'.'eric!ant. 's 0oportuni ty to prove unreasonableness is through cross-
e ramlnati0n 0f plaintiff's counsel. Therefore, in the same manner in 
"hie~ defendant failed to challenge the reasonableness of attorney's 
~ees in 'lcl:une a hove, defendant has failed in this case to present 
>:''.'lderice that plaintiff's counsel's fees are unreasonable. The only 
":iJence on Lhe question is the testimony of attorney Ivins which 
i..,~i Les :..rat the fee is reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The ~vidence conclusivelv supports the trial court's finding that 
:..11e ~ffirmative defenses were either, waived, performed or merged in 
·1e crust deed and trust deed note. The unjust enrichment theory of 
~·,1oe~:;i,nt 1s not applicable to defendant's counter claim. Attorney 
· r:>r" v ... 'a r ded hv the lower Court we re reasonable. The trial court's 
..... ..,:. .;•11,ul,~ therefore be affirmed. 
( 15) 
Respectfu!lv submitteci ~his_,!___________ dav 0f 
~. 
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